Munchhausen Trilemma

The Munchhausen Trilemma serves as a criticism of justifying knowledge that goes like this:

If we ask of any knowledge: "How do I know that it's true?", we may provide proof; yet that same question can be asked of the proof, and any subsequent proof. The Münchhausen trilemma is that we have only three options when providing proof in this situation:

1. The circular argument, in which theory and proof support each other (i.e. we repeat ourselves at some point)
   
2. The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum (i.e. we just keep giving proofs, presumably forever)
   
3. The axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts (i.e. we reach some bedrock assumption or certainty)
   

As a layman, the Trilemma is helpful in summarizing the ways we can justify knowledge, but does what it says represent a declaration that knowledge is ultimately impossible? For me, the answer is no.

First, i’ll acknowledge the ways the term “knowledge” can be used:

1. ”knowledge that” - comprehension of concrete facts or abstract concepts that can be demonstrated in the real world.
   
2. ”knowledge how” - comprehension of approaches or techniques in accomplishing simple tasks or complex endeavors.
   
3. ”knowledge of” - acquaintance with people

I also have to declare my belief that absolute knowledge of anything is unattainable. When I say this, I mean that with regard to any of the three ways the term “knowledge” can be used, I can never be genuinely 100% certain that I know something is true. I may be certain to a reasonable doubt, or certain beyond conceivable doubt, even certain that my belief will never be falsified in human history - but I have to acknowledge that there could be a 1-in-a-centillion chance that I could be wrong about it.

Given my skepticism about absolute knowledge, the Trilemma sorts itself for me in the following way:

1. circularity is unacceptable - I won’t knowingly go there.
   
2. Infinite regression will get me closer to the truth, but never fully reach absolute truth. There’s a point of diminishing returns in this approach.
   
3. Axioms are useful when regression has proceeded to an absurdly detailed level. This serves as a practical substitute for 2).

This becomes part of my toolbox for thinking.

My work here is done.

Show Me The Money

Doug claims he has a one hundred dollar bill in his pocket. What is my reaction? It may be a number of things, but if we characterize it along the “interest axis”, then I might be anywhere from wholly disinterested to obsessively interested. If I sincerely don’t care, then the fact of Doug having or not having a $100 bill in his pocket means nothing to me, although it may mean quite a lot to Doug. You might characterize me as apathetic with regards to Doug’s claim. I believe it can be known whether Doug has $100 in his pocket, but I don’t care.

You can see the parallel to religious belief shaping up here, can’t you?

At the one end of the “interest axis”, I do not want nor need to know the answer of whether Doug has that bill in his pocket. No problem exists for me here, but it may be that Doug expected me to express some interest. I won't go into what Doug’s motivations are for this expectation - because I cannot know without some honest and heart-felt conversation with Doug. My absence of interest does not present a problem for me, with regards to Doug’s potential ownership of a $100 bill. But if Doug had a motive in claiming ownership of this bill, he might have some disappointment that I don't have the same interest as he does in sharing the view that Doug has $100 dollars in his pocket.

If I _am_ interested, then I might ask that Doug show the $100 bill to me. If he can show me the bill, then I know that he indeed has what he claims to have. However, if he doesn’t show me the bill, then what am I to think?

WHAT. AM. I. TO. THINK?

This is where people who believe in God are. They do not show the $100 bill to me, consequently, I am unable to be sure that the claimed $100 bill exists. As far as Doug and the money goes, I am equally justified in believing that there is no bill in Doug's pocket, as I am believing that there is, given that I have no bias towards Doug’s veracity. One major difference between Doug and a God-believer is that I know for a fact that $100 bills exist, and it is possible for Doug to obtain one. The God-believer, however, can make the claim that God exists, but they will not produce this God for my inspection. It may be possible for a person to demonstrate God’s existence in the way that Doug can produce a $100 bill for my inspection, but it has never been done. That implies that the probability that a God - in the sense that Christians claim - can be physically demonstrated to exist is very low. It may be possible that a deist conception of God exists, but the underlying assumption of deism is that the deist God does not interact with the world, thus a physical demonstration of its existence is highly unlikely. Similarly, the pantheist conception of God - that we and all of reality are part of God, is unlikely to be demonstrable, although it might be more likely than the other two conceptions.

Where does this all lead?

It leads us to demand that the God-believer show us the money. If Doug can show us the money, then so should they. If the God-believer claims that God can interact with the world, then it’s reasonable to expect that they can physically demonstrate it's existence.

SHOW. ME. THE. MONEY!

Argument from Ignorance

Our inability to understand and accept physical truths is irrelevant to the universe - it doesn't care what we believe ... so arguing that existence can only be explained by the supernatural is just publicly displaying our lack of knowledge. It is an argument from ignorance.

How do we define "truth" - so that we can discuss the difference between natural and supernatural explanations for phenomena? Without getting into various theories of truth - a good operational definition is that truth is the model that best explains the material patterns that can be examined and confirmed in the physical world.

When we say "gravity is true" or "gravity is real", we assert that a ball will fall to the ground when we release it - every time - throughout all eternity, as long as no counteracting force is applied. Yet we still refer to gravity as a "theory" - first with Newton's theory, then with Einstein's theory of general relativity that ascribes gravity to spacetime curvature.

When you believe in the supernatural, you do so without evidence and rational justification. Attributing existence to a "creator" - an entity onto which you then project the characteristics of eternalness, omnipresence, omniscience, and the ability to interact with you and provide benefits for you and those you care for - or occasionally, disadvantages & retribution for those who you disfavor - this requires abandoning reason and your own senses. Oh ... and did I mention the afterlife? The addition of an afterlife sure makes it more believable.

Where, in this universe, is there credible evidence of anything supernatural? Why would extending this wholly unsupported, irrational conception to a hypothetical ultimate being (god) make sense if the simplest evidence of lesser supernatural conceptions has never been produced - let alone verified? Why, if there is no such thing as ghosts or angels or demons, is the idea of a god worth broaching in social discourse, let alone subjecting to the scrutiny of rational inquiry?

How do we know that something is true?

How do we know that something is true?

Other than the fact that "knowing" and "true" are topics that can take volumes to discuss - that's a fairly simple thing. ... just joking people ...

The simple answer is, we really don't "know" anything with absolute certainty. We **can** personally have a high confidence that some things are the way we think they are - but that is still more of an emotional state (we "feel" certain) than it is a statement than is testable and will yield the results that we expect.

Therein lies the problem - as human beings, we "know" things based on a combination of personal experience, reasoning, education and sometimes, less formal avenues.

Personal experience is reliable to a point. We know that we "stick" to the ground - more or less - that tells us gravity is real. We know that when we walk through a door, there is something on the other side. We know that night comes at the end of day, and day at the end of night. We know not to run with scissors.

Personal experience is less reliable because we can't experience absolutely everything - so we personally can never have "complete" knowledge, if such a thing is even possible.We **can** however, become really good at some things. A carpenter with several thousand hours of experience is better at carpentry than the average man on the street. A carpenter with ten thousand hours or more of experience might be thought of as having mastery of his trade. The same holds true of plumbing, and car mechanics, and machine operation, and guitar playing. You can become good at a few things, really good at fewer things, and if you have an aptitude, you may become a master at something. Eric Clapton is a great guitarist, but he started as a schoolboy - spent hour after hour, day after day, year after year honing his craft. He's probably not worth a shit at plumbing, but he **knows** how to play a guitar.

That raises another aspect of knowledge - there is practical knowledge - "how" to play a guitar, and theoretical knowledge - "that" a guitar produces sounds based on string vibration and acoustic resonance. So "knowledge how" and "knowledge that" are two major forms of knowing - although others have been proposed.

Plato famously defined knowledge as "justified true belief". Just that statement raises the possibility that a person can believe something, but that something to not be true. That then devolves into how is something proven to be true.

For most of us, then, we know things that we have personal experience of, and we believe things with certainty, but with varying levels of real (formal) knowledge. Let me report the existence of the invisible fire-breathing dragon in my garage. I might not be able to prove this assertion - but I might be able to convince someone that I do have a dragon in my garage. What allows me to do this (assuming that someone really believed what I told them)?

I might be believable to my fellow invisible-fire-breathing-dragon believers because I'm a sober, reliable person who has never told them a falsehood. No matter that this is a real whopper, someone might actually believe this because I'm reliable. I might also be believed because that person respects me - I may have earned their respect through completely unrelated avenues, but this respect (and trust) might then transfer to accepting my assertion of a dragon infestation. My fellow invisible-fire-breathing-dragon believers might also believe my claim because they're pre-disposed to belief in dragons, and this confirms that belief. They might also believe my dragon claim because they're gullible, uncritical, lazy, not very smart - it starts to sound like I'm being critical of people, so I'll stop. My point is that there are many reasons that we believe things that aren't provable, and (I assume, from my limited experience) fewer ways to believe things that **are** provably true.

From here, we can take the fork in the road that explores ways we can be fooled (if we fall prey to verbal tricks and logical fallacies); we can take the fork that leads to how we can convince large segments of the population that things are to be believed (with and without justification); and we can take other forks into scientific method, probability, epistemology, marketing - it's a trip that could take a while.

I'll close with the idea that personal knowledge is those experiences and beliefs that serve you reliably in your day-to-day life, without the need to rigorously test their truth value. Job One is getting through the day successfully - the rest is the truly fun stuff!